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Abstract: Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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In recent work (McGrath 2011), Sarah McGrath presents a puzzle for moral realists which relies on an alleged incompatibility between moral realism and some intuitive judgments about when it's appropriate to defer to an expert. To illustrate, suppose that Luc regards Sarah as a geography expert. He asks her where Tartu is, Sarah tells him that Tartu is in Estonia, and Luc forms the belief that Tartu is in Estonia (relying on no evidence other than Sarah’s testimony). Intuitively, Luc’s deference is not suspicious; more generally, there is nothing suspicious about relying exclusively on the opinion of geography experts about geographical matters. Suppose now that John regards Stephanie as a moral expert. Stephanie advises John that eating meat is morally permissible. On the basis of this testimony alone, John forms the belief that eating meat is morally permissible. Unlike Luc and Sarah, in this case it does seem that John's behavior is suspicious. One might capture this suspiciousness with the claim that it's inappropriate to justify one's moral beliefs exclusively by deferring to moral experts. And yet, if moral realism is true, the case of John and Stephanie should be exactly analogous to the case of Luc and Sarah because in each case there is a realm of independent facts for the expert to report on. The moral realist seems to lack an explanation of this asymmetry. As McGrath (2011: 117) puts it:

If [...] there is a domain of deep and unobvious moral facts, then it is natural to expect that some of us – intuitively, the “moral experts” – would be better placed to discover these facts than others. In principle, then, moral deference should strike us as no more peculiar than deference about scientific matters or geography.

By contrast, McGrath observes that anti-realist accounts of morality, e.g. emotivism and relativism, are perfectly compatible with the attribution of suspiciousness to John’s behaviour, since these views reject the existence of – to put it in McGrath’s words – a domain of deep and unobvious moral facts. Call this objection to realism the Puzzle of Moral Deference.
In this paper, we will take up this puzzle and pursue four aims. Our first aim is to show that the Puzzle of Moral Deference is a problem for various non-realist metaethical views; if realists face it, then so do many others. Our second aim is to argue that the analogy between morality and geography that motivates the puzzle is misleading; even if realism is correct, the case of Luc and Sarah is not analogous to the case of John and Stephanie. If so, the force of the puzzle is undermined. Our third aim is to explain why the puzzle seemed so puzzling in the first place. We will offer a new explanation of the suspicious of moral deference, and explain why this explanation doesn't require giving up the claim that there are deep, unobvious facts about morality that can be true independently of what we think about them. In a nutshell, our solution is that the suspiciousness of moral deference can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. Our final aim is to assess which metaethical views can avail themselves of our explanation, and suggest some reasons for preferring it over other explanations on offer. If what we say is correct, then the metaethical views that can adopt our reply to The Puzzle of Moral Deference have an advantage over their counterparts.

1 The Puzzle in More Detail

Before we discuss our solution to the Puzzle of Moral Deference, we need to straighten out some of the finer details. As we introduced it above, the puzzle consists of three premises. Here it is more schematically:

(1) If moral realism is true, then there are moral experts.
(2) If there are moral experts, deference to them should not be suspicious.
(3) Moral deference does seem suspicious.
___________________________________________________________
Therefore, moral realism is false.


Let's start by unpacking the first premise. There are many versions of realism, but two claims are distinctive of any version: first, the things a certain discourse speaks about exist, and second, they exist independently of anyone’s conceptual schemes, beliefs, preferences, reasoning, and so on. Geographical realism, then, maintains that there is a fact of the matter regarding e.g. the location of Tartu. Correspondingly, a geography expert is someone who is better positioned than geography novices vis-à-vis geography facts.
No doubt there is much that can be said about how to characterise realism, expertise, and the relations between them. For our purposes, what's important to note is that one way out of the Puzzle of Moral Deference would be to deny this premise. For example, one might defend an epistemicist position with respect to moral discourse along the following lines. In cases of moral controversy, our epistemic limits prevent us from reaching conclusive verdict even though there is a fact of the matter. One way to develop this idea is to contend that moral controversy arises in virtue of the vagueness of moral predicates. For example, this view can say that abortion is a borderline instance of the predicate ‘being permissible’: the predicate neither determinately applies, nor determinately does not apply to it. Epistemicism about vagueness maintains that vague predications have sharp boundaries, but we cannot access them due to our epistemic limits.​[1]​ So, the epistemicist maintains that there is no vagueness in the world or in language. Instead, vagueness is an purely epistemic phenomenon which need not lead us to revise our commitment to realism. In this way, epistemicism can be harnessed to argue for the compatibility between realism and the absence of expertise. An epistemicist can say that nobody is better positioned than anybody else when it comes to identifying the boundaries of a vague predicate.
This attempt at denying the first premise of the Puzzle is not compelling, though. For one thing, the idea that moral realism had better adopt epistemicism in order to make sense of moral vagueness has been thoroughly criticised.​[2]​ But even granted that realism should go epistemicist about moral vagueness, and even granted – for the sake of the argument – that all cases of moral controversy are cases of moral vagueness, this line of thinking would be hard to extend far enough to deny the first premise of the Puzzle. The trouble is uncontroversial cases: it'd be implausible to say that a sentence such as ‘torturing babies for fun is morally permissible’ displays vagueness, for this is a paradigm case in which the predicate does not apply. So, appealing to vagueness won't work. Realists had better countenance the possibility of moral experts.
Let's now turn to premise two, the idea that moral deference shouldn't be suspicious if moral realism is true. First, let us stipulate – following McGrath – that the feeling of suspiciousness concerns doxastic and not propositional justification. That is to say, the challenge is to explain why forming beliefs exclusively on the basis of expert testimony strikes us as inappropriate, irrespective of whether the those beliefs could have been justified some other way. Above, we motivated this claim by pointing out the parallels between moral deference and geographical deference: in each case, the appropriateness of deference is explained by the presence of unobvious facts for experts to report on. But one might doubt this analogy, for there are cases where deference is suspicious in non-moral discourses: compare accepting the claim that Tartu is in Estonia on the basis of expert testimony to accepting the claim that Tartu is on Mars.
However it may be, this way out of the Puzzle fails to appreciate that the intuitions at issue here needn’t be hard and fast. All that’s needed to get the puzzle up and running is some asymmetry between our intuitions about deference in moral and non-moral discourses; this is compatible with there being some moral deference that seems appropriate and some non-moral deference that seems suspicious. It is hard to deny that there is something to McGrath’s intuition that there is something special about moral deference; even defenders of moral deference acknowledge this.​[3]​ Moreover, even if one remains convinced that moral deference and non-moral deference are symmetrical, there are dialectical reasons for setting these concerns aside and granting McGrath's intuitions. Doing so avoids a stalemate of intuitions, where one interlocutor says moral deference is intuitively more suspicious than non-moral deference while the other denies this. These situations rarely result in philosophical progress. If it turns out that there is a solution to the Puzzle of Moral Deference that can respect McGrath's intuitions, then even philosophers who were prone to deny those intuitions should rejoice: they can now offer a reply to the puzzle that rests on firmer ground than contested intuitions. So, we will follow McGrath by granting that there is an asymmetry here.
At this point, however, one might wonder whether the asymmetry that motivates this puzzle is really about morality at all. Instead, the difference might be explained by whether the proposition one defers about is controversial. That is, one might agree that John’s deference to Stephanie is suspicious while Luc’s deference to Sarah is perfectly appropriate, but insist that this depends on the fact that while Luc is deferring about an uncontroversial proposition, John is not. If this diagnosis is correct, the Puzzle of Moral Deference does not really stem from an asymmetry between moral and non-moral discourse.​[4]​ Consider these examples:

(1)	Dave defers to Dana on the claim that torturing babies is wrong.
(2)	Dave defers to Dana on the claim that capital punishment deters crime.
(3)	Dave defers to Dana on the claim that God exists.

If there were a genuine epistemological puzzle in which intuitions divide along the non-moral/moral line, one would expect deference in the first case to seem more problematic than deference in the other cases. But this does not seem to be the case: (2)-(3) seem to be more suspicious.
While we think there is something insightful about this diagnosis, we don't think it shows that the Puzzle of Moral Deference can be reduced to a more general epistemological puzzle about deference and controversy. We think that even if one grants that deferring on controversial issues is suspicious, there is still a specifically moral puzzle here.
To see why, note that controversy is not strictly necessary for suspicious deference. To begin with, nothing prevents us from supposing that John has never thought about the question whether eating meat is morally permissible: he might well form a belief in this proposition by relying exclusively on Stephanie’s testimony without ipso facto disagreeing with her. Moreover, suspicious moral deference is not limited to controversial propositions. Consider case (1). Even though it is uncontroversial that torturing babies is wrong, Dave is doing something suspicious in deferring to Dana. It seems appropriate to react to Dave’s deference with incredulity: ‘Why do you need to defer to Dana about that?! You should have made up your own mind!’.
So, it seems that the presence of controversy (both in the sense that the person who defers and the alleged expert are in disagreement, and in the sense that the proposition whose justification one defers about is controversial) isn’t necessary for suspiciousness. If so, an appeal to the suspiciousness of deference on controversial topics doesn't eliminate the puzzle.
Having said that, we believe that (2) and (3) are cases of suspicious non-moral deference, so we are ready to admit that there are suspicious cases of non-moral deference and that moral content isn’t the only relevant source of suspicion here. In particular, we find it prima facie plausible to accept this principle: ‘the more central an area of inquiry is to your sense of identity, that more suspicious it is to defer about it’. Surely, more needs to be said about this, but provisionally it enables us to make sense of the shift of intuitions between geographical deference and religious or political deference: political and religious issues are usually more central to our identity than geographical ones. Anyway, in working from the assumption that moral deference is suspicious, we don't mean to rule out the possibility that other kinds of deference might be suspicious too. All this is compatible with thinking that there is a distinctively moral puzzle, so long as there is something to our suspicion about John and Stephanie that does not reduce to the presence of controversy.
Let us now move on to the third premise of the Puzzle. Roughly, it says that moral deference seems suspicious. This glosses over some complications, so we propose to put the point more precisely this way: if one performs an action (or holds a belief) liable to moral evaluation, and one justifies that action (or belief) by relying exclusively on an expert’s opinion, one is doing something that appears suspicious.​[5]​ This captures the idea behind the Puzzle of Moral Deference, but McGrath notes that it needs to be qualified to avoid counterexamples. Since our solution to the puzzle depends on these qualifications, we will review them here. Consider a case in which:

(A) John and Stephanie agree on moral principles, but Stephanie is an expert on some relevant empirical or conceptual question.

John believes that he ought to give some of his income to charity, and that he ought to give it to the charity that saves the most lives per dollar. But, John doesn't know which one that is. So, he asks Stephanie, a friend working in the non-profit sector, for advice. She tells John which charities save the most lives per dollar, and John donates accordingly.

There's nothing suspicious about John’s deferring to an expert’s opinion here. This is because Stephanie does not really act as a moral expert. She tells John where his money will save the most lives, and John draws a moral conclusion from this empirical claim. The same can be said about cases where Stephanie has a better grasp of some concept relevant to John’s decision. Suppose that John has a moral obligation never to employ terms of ethnic abuse (perhaps he has promised his mother that he will not do this). John is aware that among pejorative terms, there are terms of ethnic abuse, but does not know which are which. John comes across the term ‘boche’. He doesn’t know whether he would break his promise by using it because he doesn’t have the associated concept. If Stephanie does, there is nothing suspicious about John’s relying on Stephanie’s advice about the use of this term.​[6]​
In light of these cases, premise three of the Puzzle of Moral Deference must be qualified. It should exclude cases where the expert testimony concerns a non-moral empirical or conceptual question rather than a moral one.

(B) John and Stephanie agree on moral principles, but John recognises that Stephanie can better apply those principles.

John is teaching a class in which one student, Kevin, has made his job difficult throughout the semester by disrupting class. When it comes time to grade one of Kevin's papers, John knows that the morality requires grading the paper according to its merit, but he worries that his frustration with Kevin will make him too harsh. So, John asks a colleague, Stephanie, for advice. She suggests the grade that she thinks the paper deserves, and John grades accordingly.​[7]​

Again, there is nothing suspicious about John’s reliance on Stephanie here. To avoid counterexamples of this sort, premise three should require that the two parties are in equally good position to apply their moral beliefs – they should be equally free from bias. For similar reasons, it should also exclude cases where one party's cognitive resources are compromised for reasons other than bias (e.g. tiredness or drunkenness).
In light of this, McGrath limits her claims about suspiciousness to those of pure moral deference: cases where deference is not made appropriate by differential familiarity with the non-moral facts or differentially functional cognitive equipment. We propose to unpack her claims this way:

It is unreasonable to form moral beliefs based exclusively on expert testimony in cases where one defers to another who is an equal with respect to cognitive equipment and familiarity with the relevant empirical and conceptual facts.​[8]​

This reformulation of premise three clarifies that it makes no claims about impure cases of moral deference; only pure cases give rise to suspicion. On the face of it, this premise is still suitable to get the Puzzle of Moral Deference up and running. It correctly predicts suspicion in the following case:

(C) John defers to Stephanie's moral expertise.

John slaps Alonzo’s face when Alonzo interprets John’s question uncharitably at colloquium. John’s only defense is that Stephanie told him that this was a situation in which slapping is morally permissible.

Here, John relies exclusively on Stephanie’s opinion on a moral question. Hence, as McGrath puts it, this seems to be a pure case of moral deference. Taking these qualifications together, the third premise of the Puzzle of Moral Deference can be summarised thus: if John performs an action liable to moral evaluation (or forms a moral belief), and he justifies that action (or belief) by relying exclusively on Stephanie’s moral testimony, John is apparently doing something suspicious. As a result, discussion of whether the Puzzle of Moral Deference is a threat to realism (or other metaethical views) should focus on cases of pure moral deference only, leaving aside cases in which asymmetries in cognitive equipment or familiarity with the evidence make deference appropriate.

2 If the Puzzle of Moral Deference is a Problem, Whose Problem is it?

Now that the details of the Puzzle of Moral Deference are on the table, we can ask who it is a puzzle for. McGrath characterises it as an objection to moral realism. On closer inspection, the puzzle has significantly wider implications.​[9]​
The puzzle gets off the ground by drawing attention to an asymmetry in our intuitions about the permissibility of deference in some areas as compared to others, and suggesting that realists should not predict such an asymmetry. As a result, one would expect it to be possible to run the puzzle against any view that would not predict the asymmetry, whatever other features that view has. There are metaethical views that agree with realism about whether there is a fact of the matter about moral questions, but give different accounts of the metaphysics in virtue of which those facts are what they are. So, one would expect these views to face the puzzle for the same reasons as realists do.
To illustrate, consider metaethical constructivism. Contra realists, constructivists hold that the truth or falsity of moral claims is not fixed by facts that are independent of the practical point of view; instead, normative claims are true or false in virtue of what follows from an agent’s constellation of practical commitments. This view naturally suggests relativism about morality: John’s practical commitments might be different than Stephanie’s, so the normative facts might be different for John than for Stephanie.​[10]​ Such constructivists would have no problem explaining the asymmetry the Puzzle of Moral Deference picks out: deference seems wrong in moral contexts because there’s no objective fact of the matter to defer about. But, not all constructivists take this relativist line. Rather, some constructivists agree with realists that which moral sentences are true does not depend on which particular agent’s perspective one takes up. For example, according to Christine Korsgaard,​[11]​ it is constitutive of agency that one make oneself into a unified agent, and – Korsgaard argues – this requires a commitment to governing oneself in accordance with the categorical imperative. If so, actions that violate the categorical imperative will come out wrong no matter whose perspective we take up, because the commitment that explains their wrongness is a necessary feature of anything that counts as a practical point of view. Korsgaard, then, faces the same challenge as realists do when confronted with the Puzzle of Moral Deference: moral deference looks suspicious, but on her account it is relevantly similar to areas of discourse in which deference is unproblematic. For this reason, we disagree with McGrath​[12]​ on the claim that Korsgaard’s version of Kantian constructivism is not threatened by the Puzzle of Moral Deference.
Korsgaard attempts to reconcile the thought that morality is an objective area of discourse with a denial of realism by appealing to the claim that some practical commitments are constitutive of agency, but other constructivists (and defenders of other antirealist views) attempt this feat in other ways. For our purposes, the details don’t matter. Whichever strategy one employs in order to make good on the objectivity of moral discourse, one’s view will face the Puzzle of Moral Deference because it’s exactly this feature that makes our suspicions about moral deference puzzling.
In fact, the Puzzle of Moral Deference reaches even further. It can be run against any view according to which even some moral questions have objective answers, even if many do not. For example, consider David Velleman’s version of constructivism.​[13]​ According to Velleman, it’s constitutive of agency that one aim at self-understanding. He argues in several places that this desire puts some constraints on the kind of commitments one can rationally undertake.​[14]​ If so, even though the moral facts might vary from perspective to perspective, all perspectives will give rise to a shared core of moral themes (general and limited as they may be), because the commitments in virtue of which they are true are necessarily common to all agents.​[15]​ On this view, questions about those themes have objective answers, and so suspicion about deference on those matters is just as puzzling for Velleman as it is for realists.
We’ve been arguing that the significance of the Puzzle of Moral Deference is quite far-reaching. For ease of expression, we will describe it as a threat to those who think that morality is an objective area of discourse. By doing so, we do not mean to be taking on any substantive view about what it takes for an area of discourse to be objective in the ordinary use of the word. Rather, we just need a label for views targeted by the Puzzle of Moral Deference: views according to which the answers to moral questions do not depend on who you ask.​[16]​ In the next section we shall provide a way of blocking the Puzzle of Moral Deference which doesn’t require giving up the objectivity of ethics.

3 An Alternate Explanation of Case (C)

The Puzzle of Moral Deference can be summarised as follows. If morality were an objective area of discourse, there ought to be moral experts; non-moral expert deference strikes as unproblematic; and yet, pure moral expert deference appears to be suspicious. Views that deny the objectivity of ethics easily account for this asymmetry. Therefore, views that embrace it owe us an explanation of these appearances. This argument crucially relies on the analogy between the moral and the non-moral cases: in both cases, a less expert interlocutor defers to a more expert interlocutor, or so someone pushing the puzzle contends.
Our solution to this puzzle has two parts. First, we will argue that the analogy between moral and non-moral deference breaks down. Second, we’ll show how the way in which the analogy breaks down explains the relevant suspiciousness without threatening the objectivity of ethics.
We believe that the analogy between cases of pure moral deference and deference in other alleged objective areas of discourse, e.g. geography, is untenable because once the Puzzle of Moral Deference has been restricted to cases of pure moral deference, the interlocutors are epistemic peers. Applied to case (C), the analogy breaks down because Stephanie is not in fact an expert compared to John about the moral issue under scrutiny.
To unpack this, let's begin by introducing a widely accepted account of what it takes to be someone's epistemic peer due to Thomas Kelly (Kelly 2005: 173-4):

Let us say that two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some question if and only if they satisfy the following two conditions:
(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence and arguments which bear on that question, and
(ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias. ​[17]​

The qualifications McGrath makes to premise three of the Puzzle of Moral Deference come very close to assuring that interlocutors in pure cases of moral deference will be epistemic peers with respect to the question on which one is deferring to the other. Specifically, the requirement that the interlocutors are equals with respect to cognitive equipment guarantees that they will meet condition (ii), and the requirement that they are equally familiar with the relevant empirical and conceptual facts goes some way toward satisfying condition (i). In fact, it guarantees that they will satisfy condition (i) unless there is something other than familiarity with the empirical and conceptual facts that two interlocutors need to share in order to be equally familiar with the evidence. This is interesting because cases that do not satisfy the purity constraint cannot be used to motivate the Puzzle of Moral Deference, while cases that do satisfy it look like they might be cases of epistemic parity rather than expertise. If so, there would be no cases available for getting the Puzzle of Moral Deference up and running.
Still, one could resist this line of thinking by claiming that the subjects in pure cases needn't be epistemic peers. So, we should look more closely at condition (i).
It’s controversial whether there is any evidence that bears on moral questions that is irreducibly moral. Thankfully, we needn’t settle that question here in order to undermine the force of the Puzzle of Moral Deference. This is because anyone using the puzzle against realism (or other views threatened by it) has to grant their opponents that there is nothing beyond equal familiarity with the relevant non-moral facts that interlocutors must share in order to be equally familiar with the evidence bearing on a moral question. To see why, let us pause on what else – in addition to familiarity with the relevant empirical and conceptual facts – two individuals might need to share in order to meet condition (i). There are two possibilities. One possibility is that they would need to share familiarity with some irreducible facts about morality. If this were the case, interlocutors could be equally familiar with the non-moral empirical and conceptual facts but still not be equally familiar with the evidence full stop. Yet, this possibility is not available to someone pushing the Puzzle of Moral Deference because, were there such independent facts about what morality requires, those facts would make morality an objective area of discourse. This is exactly what the puzzle was supposed to cast doubt on. So, embracing this possibility would make the Puzzle of Moral Deference self-defeating.
The second possibility is that in order to meet condition (i), two interlocutors must share something like a preference, attitude, cultural context, or point of view that is not necessarily shared by all agents. If this were the case, they could be equally familiar with the relevant empirical and conceptual facts but still not be equally familiar with the evidence full stop. But this possibility is not available to someone pushing the Puzzle of Moral Deference either, because by insisting that the answers to moral questions depend on these features of the agents investigating them, the objector will have begged the question. An argument that morality is not objective cannot defend its premises by appeal to the claim that morality is not objective.
Thus, in order to avoid self-defeat or question-begging, anyone wishing to use the Puzzle of Moral Deference as an objection to metaethical views that make morality objective should grant that equal familiarity with the relevant non-moral empirical and conceptual facts is all that's needed to satisfy condition (i). This isn't to say that it is all that's needed, just that someone pushing the objection we're considering here needs to grant that. And, given the constraints imposed on premise three of the Puzzle of Moral Deference, it follows that the sets of individuals picked out by the puzzle satisfy Kelly's definition of epistemic parity. Therefore, we contend that the kinds of cases that give rise to the Puzzle of Moral Deference are not cases of moral expert deference after all. In this respect, moral deference and geographical deference are not analogous.
Having rejected the analogy between the moral and non-moral case needed to raise the Puzzle of Moral Deference, we still need to explain why John’s behavior in (C) is suspicious. Our explanation, in a nutshell, is this: John’s deference is inappropriate because he fails to recognise that he is exclusively deferring to an epistemic peer when so doing is not rational. Had he acknowledged that Stephanie is his epistemic peer, he shouldn’t have exclusively deferred to her.
This explanation of the suspiciousness of pure moral deference relies on the claim that total deference to an epistemic peer is inappropriate. One might doubt this, so we will defend the plausibility of this claim by looking briefly at the epistemological debate about the rational response to peer disagreement. We will suggest that even on the views most amenable to deference, total deference to an epistemic peer is still suspicious.
In this literature, there are two competing views: conciliationism maintains that peers are rationally required to revise their opinions in light of discovery of their peer disagreement, while steadfast views maintain that it is rational to persist in a disagreement with an epistemic peer. Since steadfast views contend that in cases of peer disagreement rationality doesn’t require subjects to change their opinion, these approaches accept the claim that it is irrational to exclusively defer to one’s epistemic peer.​[18]​
On closer inspection, however, even conciliationism is compatible with the claim that total deference to one’s epistemic peer is not required. Conciliationism comes in two broad varieties. Authors like Christensen and Elga​[19]​ argue that peers should update their beliefs. In the literature, various models of belief updating in which one should assign the same probability of being right to the opinion of a peer and to one’s own opinion are proposed. For example, the split-the-difference model maintains that after the discovery of disagreement subjects should take roughly the arithmetic mean of their initial beliefs. In contrast, McGrath herself and Kornblith​[20]​ argue that epistemic peers should suspend judgment about moral issues. Briefly put, suspending judgment about p amounts to holding a neutral attitude towards its truth and falsity. Both belief updating and suspension of judgment don’t amount to exclusively deferring to what one’s peer believes. So, conciliationism makes room for partial deference to one’s epistemic peer, but not total deference. Thus, even the accounts of peer disagreement which recommend the most deference to one’s peer stop short of recommending total deference. This is intuitively right: your peer is no better off epistemically than you are, so it’s hard to see what justification you could have for totally disregarding your own reasoning. These remarks support the contention that exclusive deference to one’s epistemic peer is inappropriate.
Summing up: the Puzzle of Moral Deference can be dissolved in two steps. First, the analogy between exclusive deference in moral and non-moral cases vanishes once one recognises that the Puzzle of Moral Deference focuses on cases of pure moral deference; in such cases, the pairs are epistemic peers. Second, the initial suspicion one feels about moral deference can be vindicated by appeal to this very fact about epistemic parity. This explanation of the suspiciousness of pure moral deference doesn't put the objectivity of morality into question.
This explanation strikes us as plausible, but it can't be the whole story because not all cases of deference are cases of disagreement. For example, John might defer to Stephanie on some question without having an opinion about the question prior to his deference. So, to complete our explanation of what’s suspicious about John’s deference, we need to extend our account to cover these kinds of cases.
The first thing to notice is that in order for a case to be one of pure moral deference – the kind that motivates the Puzzle of Moral Deference – then it is impossible for John to agree with Stephanie prior to deferring. If he did, then whatever reasons he had for believing the proposition at issue would make his deference impure; he’d be relying both on Stephanie and on those reasons. So, the only kinds of cases a solution to the Puzzle of Moral Deference needs to explain are cases where John and Stephanie disagree and cases where John has no opinion. Cases where John and Stephanie disagree are easy; our explanation in terms of peer disagreement applies to them straightforwardly. The same is true of cases where John suspends judgment because he thinks that the available evidence doesn’t settle the question; in such cases, John disagrees with Stephanie in the same way that an agnostic disagrees with an atheist. All that’s left, then, are cases where John has no opinion because he has never considered the question. These cases look troubling for our diagnosis because there is no disagreement, but recall that we’ve argued that in order for any case to be suspicious in the way relevant to the Puzzle of Moral Deference, the subjects must be epistemic peers. So, if John has never thought about the question and so has no familiarity with the evidence, Stephanie has no evidence either. And this behavior of relying on the testimony of someone who has no evidence is plainly suspicious no matter the area of discourse (either because one fails to acknowledge that the other has no evidence, or because one does acknowledge this and defers anyway). Apparently, then, our diagnosis extends to all the relevant cases.
Now that the details of our proposal are on the table, let us pause to forestall a possible misunderstanding.​[21]​ We've just argued that, in pure cases of moral deference, the pairs are really epistemic peers, and that this is what explains our suspicion about them. This might seem to commit us to the claim that there aren't really moral experts after all. And that might seem to be a disappointing result, both because many find it intuitively plausible that there are, and because earlier in this paper we promised to grant McGrath the intuitions that give rise to the Puzzle of Moral Deference, one of which was that if realism is true then some of us will be moral experts.
Thankfully, nothing we've said commits us to denying the existence of moral experts. Our claim is more limited: it's just that there are no moral experts in the kinds of cases that can be used to motivate the Puzzle of Moral Deference. As we noted in the last section, some of these restrictions on what kinds of cases can be used are dialectical: they concern what someone using the puzzle as an objection to realism can say without risking question-begging or self-defeat. So, there may be cases that are off the table for someone running the objection, but nonetheless on the table for thinking about whether there are moral experts.
To get more specific, the point that is of import here is that given McGrath’s own characterization of cases of pure moral deference, given Kelly’s well-tried definition of epistemic parity, and given that the supporter of the Puzzle of Moral Deference should – to avoid question-beggingness or self-defeat – grant that there is nothing over and above equal familiarity with the relevant non-moral empirical and conceptual facts that agents must share in order to be equally familiar with the evidence bearing on a moral question, it follows that there are no moral experts in suspicious cases of pure moral deference. This, however, is not tantamount to saying that two agents facing a moral question are always epistemic peers, or that there cannot be moral experts to whom we might sometimes defer non-suspiciously

4 Assessing Other Solutions to the Puzzle of Moral Deference

So far, we've been articulating and defending a new solution to the Puzzle of Moral Deference. We will now argue that our solution is preferable to the ones already on offer in the literature.
The Puzzle of Moral Deference challenges realists (and others), to explain an asymmetry: moral deference appears puzzling in a way that other kinds of deference do not. This suggests two strategies for solving the puzzle. One can either show that there is no asymmetry after all, or one can offer an explanation of the asymmetry that is compatible with one's favorite metaethical view. In the first section of this paper, we argued that the second kind of solution is preferable to the first. If you have the intuitions that generate the puzzle, it's preferable because it respects your intuitions. If you don't have those intuitions, it's preferable because it allows you to grant more to your opponent and thereby avoid an intuitive stalemate. So, for the majority of this section, we shall focus on the second strategy, particularly as developed by McGrath.
Like us, McGrath's approach is to find a feature of moral discourse that makes it different from e.g. geographical discourse that promises to explain our suspicion about moral deference. Rather than appealing to the epistemic status of the interlocutors, however, she suggests that we have different aims when we engage in moral discourse than we do in other discourses. More specifically, she notices that often we care not only about getting things right morally, but also about understanding why particular actions have the moral properties that they do. This concern is not unique to moral inquiry, but it does seem particularly salient there. McGrath claims (McGrath 2011: 132):

If an agent ’s because of her belief that -ing is the right thing to do, but she does not understand why -ing is the right thing to do, this detracts from the status of her action.

And she holds that an  ‘important ideal associated with moral agency […] that of doing the right thing for the reasons that make it right’.​[22]​ Moral understanding is therefore necessary for morally worthy actions.​[23]​
Getting a bit more precise, we might regard McGrath as defending the view that moral discourse has two aims: figuring out what’s morally right to do and understanding why it’s the right thing to do. This suggests an alternative explanation of the suspiciousness of pure moral deference: pure moral deference is suspicious because it frustrates our ability to achieve moral understanding. For example, if John defers to Stephanie about the permissibility of eating meat or slapping uncharitable philosophers, he is in no position to say what's right or wrong about these actions. Call this the moral understanding explanation of the suspiciousness of pure moral deference.
The claim that moral understanding is necessary for morally worthy actions has been questioned.​[24]​ We won't assess those arguments here; however, it is interesting to point out that there is a way of developing the moral understanding explanation without committing oneself to the metaethical thesis that moral understanding is one of the aims of moral discourse.​[25]​ One can hold that moral discourse has a unique aim, (that of figuring out what’s the morally right thing to do) but that one of the things we are morally required to do is figure that out for ourselves. Pure moral deference is then suspicious because deferring agents don’t fulfill the duty of figuring out what they ought to do for themselves. This version of the moral understanding explanation makes moral understanding a duty of morality, rather than a goal of engaging in moral discourse.
The differences between these versions of the moral understanding solution are interesting, but we think that in the end they face similar problems. So, we will do our best to assess the moral understanding explanation while remaining neutral as to how best to formulate it.
Now that the moral understanding explanation is on the table, let us see whether it offers a better explanation of the suspiciousness of pure moral deference than our explanation does. It has been argued elsewhere that moral deference doesn’t frustrate moral understanding.​[26]​ However, we wish  to pursue a different line of criticism; we believe that even if moral understanding were incompatible with pure moral deference, appealing to it would not cover all the cases in which moral deference looks suspicious. If so, our explanation does a better job accounting for the intuitive data than does the moral understanding explanation, and is to that extent preferable. There are two places where we think that the moral understanding explanation falls short.
First, there are cases in which no matter whether one defers or not, one's moral understanding stays fixed. Suppose you have a moral decision to make, and you could either try to figure things out yourself, or you could defer to an equally good moral philosopher. Suppose, however, that you also know that a neurosurgeon will wipe out any memory of your deliberation after you have made the decision. So, no matter whether you defer or you don’t, you won’t gain any moral understanding. In this case, your deference is still suspicious, or at least that's how it intuitively seems to us. Counterexamples run in the opposite direction as well. Suppose now that you have a moral decision to make, and you know that after you make it you will have an opportunity to discuss the issue thoroughly with a panel of excellent moral philosophers. So, no matter what you do, you’ll end up with moral understanding. Deference still seems suspicious in this case as well. Since one can hold moral understanding fixed across decisions made on the basis of deference and decisions made on the basis of personal deliberation, this suspiciousness can’t be accounted for by appeal to the frustration of moral understanding.
It will be easier to present our second objection to the moral understanding explanation by starting with the ethical version (about our duties) and then extrapolating to the metaethical version (about the aims of moral discourse). We object to the ethical version as follows. Many moral philosophers distinguish two kinds of moral duties: perfect and imperfect.​[27]​ Perfect duties are those that you are required to fulfill at every opportunity to the fullest extent possible. For example, intuitively the duty to keep your promises is perfect. You can't get out of a promise-keeping situation by saying ‘look at all those other promises I've kept! I've done enough!’. Other considerations might override your duty to keep your promise, but the other promises you've kept cannot do this. Imperfect duties, by contrast, are those that you are required to fulfill past some threshold, but it's up to you how you reach the threshold and whether to exceed it. Suppose that there is a duty to develop one's talents. If so, it is probably an imperfect duty: one person might fulfill this duty by learning to play blues harmonica, while another might fulfill it just as well by learning to cook Thai food. If someone accused you of falling short with respect to this duty, it would be a good defense to reply: ‘look at all the effort I've put into my cooking! I've done enough!’.
Let us now consider the purported duty to promote moral understanding. Which kind of duty is it? Certainly, there are cases where we must fulfill it. Someone who defers all the time such that she never makes any of her own decisions is barely recognizable as an agent. But, there are also cases where it's much less clear that failing to promote moral understanding is in any way bad. For example, think of someone who devotes her life to moral philosophy, but still occasionally defers. That there are cases of both types suggests that if this duty exists, it's an imperfect one. This means that a person might justify her deferring in a particular case by pointing to her extensive reflection and personal deliberations about moral questions. So, the most plausible interpretation of the claim that there's a duty to achieve moral understanding is that it's an imperfect duty. If this is correct, there will be cases where deference is suspicious but this suspicion is not explicable in terms of the duty: the cases where the person deferring is already above the relevant threshold and so counts as having satisfied the duty. In these cases, the intuitive suspiciousness can’t be explained by failure with respect to the duty.
For ease of expression, we've put this objection in terms of a duty to figure things out for oneself. But, nothing hinges on which version of the moral understanding explanation one is considering. Turning to the metaethical version, one can use the same sorts of examples to suggest that, if we have an aim of achieving moral understanding, it is probably an aim that we can satisfy in various ways and need not pursue at every opportunity. That is, it's the aim-analogue of an imperfect duty. So, this version of the moral understanding explanation leaves cases out too.
One might respond to both of these objections by denying our intuitions about cases. Perhaps it's not suspicious to defer when you will later have an opportunity to discuss things with a panel of excellent moral philosophers, or perhaps it's not suspicious to defer when one already has a sufficient degree of moral understanding. We don't think so, but as we've noted before in this paper, stalemates of intuition rarely lead to philosophical progress. Similarly, one might complain that some of our cases are rather far-fetched (think of the neurosurgeon who for some reason wants to frustrate your moral understanding); we acknowledge that intuitions about weird cases can be sketchy. For both of these reasons, it'd be good if we could argue that these considerations are troublesome for the moral understanding explanation no matter one's intuitions about our cases. We think we can offer just such an argument.




We've now presented a new solution to the Puzzle of Moral Deference, and argued that it's better than other solutions. We've also argued that the puzzle threatens a wider range of views than one might have initially thought. This raises the possibility that some views threatened by the puzzle can avail themselves of our explanation while others can't. If so, the views that can embrace it have an advantage over their counterparts. This needn't mean that they are better all things considered, but it does mean that when we are tallying up the advantages and disadvantages of various metaethical views, ones that can use our explanation are better off for it.
So, let us now ask, among the many targets of the Puzzle of Moral Deference, which can avail themselves of our explanation?
Before answering this question, it is important to draw a distinction between a direct solution to the puzzle, and an indirect one. A direct solution to the puzzle consists in accepting our explanation of the suspiciousness without relying on other theses about moral epistemology. An indirect solution, by contrast, consists in accepting our explanation plus relying on other specific views about moral justification. We believe that realists who think that moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties,​[28]​ along with Kantian constructivists (and others who think that some moral norms arise from every practical standpoint)​[29]​ can offer a direct solution to the Puzzle since it will not trouble them to take on the assumption that all there is to deliberating about morality is deliberating about the non-moral facts. In the reductive realists’ case, these facts will be whichever facts they reduce moral discourse to. In the relevant constructivists' case, these facts will be conceptual facts about agency and the commitments that are constitutive of it.
By contrast, realists who think there are irreducibly moral facts (whether they're natural facts or not) can use our strategy only to provide an indirect solution to the puzzle.​[30]​ This is because, contrary to what's needed to show that the cases that motivated the Puzzle of Moral Deference are cases of epistemic parity, on these views there is evidence that could make a pair who shared empirical and conceptual evidence nonetheless fail to be peers: evidence about the irreducibly moral facts.
So, in order to use our strategy, realists of this sort need to bridge the gap between parity with respect to the non-moral evidence and parity with respect to the moral evidence by putting forward some substantive theses about the nature of moral justification. This might be done in two ways: by insisting that we have a faculty that puts us in touch with the moral facts (and so must be equally in touch with them in order to satisfy Kelly’s evidential equality condition) or by insisting that we have a faculty that allows us to infer the moral facts from the non-moral ones (and so must be equally in touch with them in order to satisfy Kelly’s cognitive equipment condition). If either of these things are true, then non-reductive realists can use the notion of epistemic parity to reject the analogy between moral and non-moral deference that gives rise to Puzzle of Moral Deference.
Still, direct solutions to the Puzzle have an advantage over indirect ones. For any view prepared to grant that there is nothing to evidence about a moral question beyond non-moral facts, it follows directly from Kelly’s definition, from premise three of the Puzzle of Moral Deference and from the dialectical commitments discussed above that the pairs in suspicious cases are peers. No further epistemological thesis is needed, so the supporter of the Puzzle of Moral Deference cannot but admit defeat. By contrast, a supporter of the Puzzle of Moral Deference is not bound to admit defeat when our solution is deployed by non-reductive realists, for she might take issue with the specific assumptions about the nature of moral evidence required for the non-reductivist to use our solution. These assumptions about moral epistemology are controversial, so the supporter of the Puzzle still has some plausible ground to stand on.
What this suggests is that non-reductive realists can employ our strategy, but their solution to the puzzle would be open to objection in a way that a reductive-realist-based solution or a constructivist-based solution is not. So, as things stand, reductive realists and the relevant kinds of constructivists have a type of response to the Puzzle of Moral Deference that non-reductive realists do not. Insofar as this response is better than others (as we argued in the last section), these views have an advantage.
Let’s take stock. The Puzzle of Moral Deference appears to challenge anyone who thinks that morality is an objective area of discourse on the grounds that we are suspicious of some cases that we would not be were morality objective. However, given that there is an alternate explanation of the suspiciousness available to some plausible metaethical views, we conclude that the relevant cases are suspicious but not in a way that threatens the objectivity of ethics. The Puzzle of Moral Deference is solved.†


University of California – San Diego, USA					Cory Davia
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^1	 	 See (Williamson 1994).
^2	 	 See e.g. (Shafer-Landau 1995). Ronald Dworkin has defended an epistemicist stance about moral indeterminacy: he accounts for such cases in terms of ignorance while maintaining that there is a fact of the matter about the right response. See (Dworkin 2011: chapter 5).
^3	 	 See e.g. (Driver 2006) and (Jones 1999).
^4	 	 We are grateful to an anonymous referee who raised this issue and provided the examples we discuss below.
^5	 	 Note that what must be accounted for is merely an appearance of suspiciousness. See (McGrath 2011: 116). Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the Puzzle targets moral testimony as well as advice: deciding what to do and what to believe in a deferential way are both suspicious.
^6	 	 We hope to remain neutral on debates about the correct account of concept possession here.
^7	 	 For a similar case, see (McGrath 2011: 114).
^8	 	 To avoid begging the question against proponents of the puzzle, let us stipulate that here we mean knowledge of empirical and conceptual facts that are not themselves irreducibly moral.
^9	 	 Paulina Sliwa (Sliwa 2012) briefly notices this, although in a rather different way than we do in this section. See footnote 15.
^10	 	 See (Street 2010).
^11	 	 See e.g. (Korsgaard 2009).
^12	 	 See (McGrath 2011: 117).
^13	 	 For the details, see (Velleman 2009).
^14	 	 See (Velleman 2006), (Velleman 2009), (Velleman 2013).
^15	 	 See (Velleman 2013: 87).
^16	 	 As McGrath (McGrath 2011: 117, fn. 11) and Sliwa (Sliwa 2012: 176-77, fn. 7) point out, it is not clear whether more sophisticated expressivist views also face the Puzzle of Moral Deference. Consider Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism. Gibbard notes that we can rely on others’ opinions as far as moral norms are concerned. He writes (Gibbard 1990: 180): ‘When conditions are right and someone else finds a norm independently credible, I must take that as favouring my own accepting the norm’. And yet, it may seem inappropriate to maintain that Gibbard’s view makes morality objective, even in the modest way we're using that label. Similar questions arise for sensibility theories, so long as the details are spelled out in a non-relativistic way. For simplicity's sake, we'll stick with saying that any view that makes morality objective is threatened by the puzzle, rather than figuring out exactly which views that criterion picks out.
^17	 	 See also (Christensen 2007: 188) and Lackey (2010: 302).
^18	 	 See especially (Rosen 2011) and (Wedgwood 2010) for a defense of this view with respect to moral discourse.
^19	 	 See (Christensen 2007) and (Elga 2007).
^20	 	 See (McGrath 2008) and (Kornblith 2010).
^21	 	 We thank an anonymous referee for raising the doubt we are about to discuss.
^22	 	 (McGrath 2011: 135).
^23	 	 See also (Hills 2009).
^24	 	 See for instance (Markovits 2010).
^25	 	 Thanks to David O. Brink for pointing this out.
^26	 	 See (Sliwa 2012).
^27	 	 There are moral theories that do not recognise this distinction, but because this isn't our only objection to the moral understanding explanation, we are willing to hitch our wagon to those that do. It is worth pointing out, however, that even theories that don't recognise it (e.g. standard act consequentialism) nonetheless often try to explain it away because they recognise the intuitive force of the distinction. Only philosophers who do not even feel this force who should be unmoved by what we say here.
^28	 	 See (Railton 1986).
^29	 	 For example, (Katsafanas: 2011).
^30	 	 See (Brink 1989) for a defense of the view that moral facts are natural facts, and (Enoch 2011) for a recent defense of the view that moral facts are not reducible to natural facts and are not themselves natural facts.
